Showing posts with label judicial review. Show all posts
Showing posts with label judicial review. Show all posts

Friday, 17 January 2014

Law report - costs in judicial review

The Corporation of Hamilton v The Ombudsman for Bermuda [2014] SC (Bda) 1 Civ

The Corporation had been unsuccessful in its contested application to seek leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The Ombudsman sought her costs of the leave application.

The Ombudsman was seeking her costs in connection with the leave application. Justice Hellman noted that previous Bermudian cases on costs in these circumstances did not appear to have been fully argued and did not refer to relevant authorities such as Mount Cook Land Ltd v Westminster City Council  [2004] CP Rep 12, which is that costs should not be awarded on unsuccessful leave applications other than exceptionally.

However, the judge pointed to exceptional circumstances in this case: the Ombudsman had a constitutional duty to publish her report on the Corporation as soon as she was able. It was reasonable for her to be actively involved in the leave application from the earliest stage in order to pre-empt any court order which might prevent her from publishing her report (at [26]). Furthermore, the Corporation had delayed in applying for leave anyway, and it was relevant for the Ombudsman to raise this delay point at the earliest opportunity (at [27]).

The decision is also notable for pointing to the possibility of interim awards on account of costs (at [53]) on the basis that if the successful party is ultimately found to be entitled to a lesser sum she must refund the difference. This is a potentially useful device for obtaining swift payment of costs in litigation, otherwise costs can take many months after the case itself to be resolved.

Law report - requirement to take a full plea

Cox v the Queen [2014] SC Bda 2 App

The Appellant had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a sex offence on the basis of a purported guilty plea in the Magistrates Court. He appealed against his conviction and sentence.

Unfortunately, it appeared that this was based on a mistake. Although the appellant had indicated that he had wished to change his plea from not guilty to guilty, this was not formally accepted by the court. The matter was adjourned and, the next time it came before the court, the court mistakenly proceeded on the basis that he had already pleaded guilty.

Justice Hellman ruled that there had not been any conviction, as the law provides that there can only be a conviction after a plea or finding of guilt (at [21]-[32]). However, he went on to quash the conviction (at [39]). He also ruled that it would not be in the interests of justice to order a re-trial on the basis that he had already spent over a year in prison, the offence was not a particularly serious one, and it would be an ordeal for the 13 year old complainant to have to give evidence again.

Comment - The judge commented that it might appear illogical to quash a conviction that had not actually occurred (at [44]). He also said that he could achieve a similar result by treating it as an application for judicial review and granting public law relief (at [45]).

I think that the judge's indication of a similar result with public law relief points to a solution which would have avoided any logical inconsistency. In my view, the proper analysis is one of an unlawful imprisonment, which could have been dealt with by treating the appeal as an application for habeas corpus or judicial review, and making an order mandating the prisoner's release and a declaration that he had not been convicted.

Law report - bring complaints before Employment Tribunal

Fleming v Director of Labour and Training [2013] SC (Bda) 80 Civ

The applicant had submitted a complaint about her employer to the Employment Inspector, in order to determine whether or not it should go before an employment tribunal.

The Inspector refused to forward the complaint to the Tribunal, stating that the employer had not breached the Employment Act.

It was HELD that when an inspector is deciding whether to forward a complaint to the Tribunal, the relevant test is similar to the test for striking out in the Supreme Court as to whether the case has any reasonable prospects of success. It is not for an inspector to make findings of fact and law for himself.

Wednesday, 22 May 2013

Law report - two sets of costs and judicial review

Kentucky Fried Chicken (Bermuda) Limited v Minister of Economy, Trade & Industry [2013] SC (Bda) 35 Civ

This judgment concerned what happens when an applicant has failed to obtain the relief they were seeking in judicial review proceedings where there is more than one respondent.

Kawaley CJ noted that this was strangely not something which had been raised before in a considered judgment in Bermuda [5].

The general position is that only one set of costs would be awarded as an applicant should not have to pay for duplication of effort. There is an exception when a second respondent has a separate interest on an issue which is not dealt with by the first respondent.

The Chief Justice took the route of allowing costs to both respondents, but only one set of costs for each issue, depending on whether the issue was one properly for the Minister or for the BIU to respond to, so as to avoid duplication of costs [7]-[10].

The Chief Justice indicated that, in future, the proper time to raise the issue of paying two sets of costs is early in the proceedings, in order to allow the parties to focus on who should play an active role in the proceedings [11].

Tuesday, 23 October 2012

Law report - constitutional claim against Prisons Commissioner

Nisbett v Commissioner of Prisons [2012] SC( Bda) 57 Civ

The Applicant had brought a constitutional motion to complain about his treatment whilst in prison for seven years.

The acts complained of were:
  1. being beaten by prison officers or fellow prisoners on their instigation;
  2. subject to inhuman solitary confinement;
  3. being given unjustifiable restrictions on family visits;
  4. being given unjustifiable restrictions on his religious diet requirements;
  5. parole documents being destroyed by corrections officers;
  6. loss of earnings due to release on licence being delayed by two years;
  7. exposure to second-hand cigarette, cannabis and crack cocaine smoke from other cells

The respondent sought to strike out the claim because one should not bring a constutional motion if there are other means of legal redress.

Hellman J held that for (1), above, the applicant could have brough a civil claim for assault or battery [33]. However, the allegation of the abuse of state power meant that this might not be adequate redress in the circumstances [34]. He did not strike out the claim but invited the parties to make submissions on what should happen with that claim next [40].

Similarly for (5) above, which might constitute wrongful imprisonment, the consitutional claim would be allowed to proceed [41].

The remaining issues were more suitable for judicial review proceedings regarding whether the prison rules had been correctly applied [45]. These allegations were struck out for the constitutional motion [48]. Presumably the applicant could re-apply for leave to commence judicial review proceedings.

Thursday, 11 October 2012

Law Report - delay and judicial review and the Ombudsman

Davis v The Minister of Economy Trade and Industry & Anor. [2012] Bda SC 48 (Civ)
 
Mr Davis had applied for judicial review of:
  • the Minister of Economy Trade and Industry's decision not to refer an unfair dismissal complaint to a tribunal; and
  • the Minister for National Security's decision not to revoke the work permit of Mr Davis' former general manager, which may have enabled the Applicant to apply for his job
 
The Respondents sought to set aside the grant of leave to apply for judicial review. Rosewood Limited, the Applicant's former employer, appeared as an interested party.
 
JR had initially been granted without a hearing. The Respondents submitted that, as it concerned decisions made more six months prior to the application, it was too late to review the decision.
 
Kawaley CJ held that seeking legal advice and preparing the case did not account for an excessive delay [10].
 
It was highly prejudicial for the first Respondent's staff to have to think back to the decision months after it was made [15]. Furthermore Rosewood had been prejudiced in its ability to defend against the unfair dismissal complaint so long after the fact [16] and after a key witness had left their employ [17].
 
It was also prejudicial to the Minister for National Security for his decision to be considered after such a delay and, further, the Applicant had already received significant redress regarding one of his complaints to the Minister [24].
 
In light of the prejudice caused to the Respondents by the delay, strong public interest reasons are required to hear the application [25].
 
Such reasons did not exist. Considering the facts of the Applicant's complaints:
  • the Employment Inspector had made a carefully reasoned decision based upon legal advice [26];
  • the Ombudsman had assisted the Applicant in resolving the procedural problems he had faced [28];
  • revoking the work permit would not have saved the Applicant's job [30];
  • the reprimand given by the Minister for National Security was not the type of response that the court would review [31]
 
Accordingly there was not sufficient public interest to justify the prejudice to the Respondents or Rosewood.
 
Regarding the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman had been involved in the complaints prior to the JR application. The case illustrates the value that the Ombudsman's services provide as an alternative to JR in circumstances where it is not reasonable to expect an individual to resort to court action.
 
JR will rarely be appropriate after the Ombudsman has reviewed a case. Exceptionally it may be done in order to attempt to enforce recommendations made by the Ombudsman [38]. However, in the present case, the application was designed to obtain relief that the Ombudsman's findings did not support [39].
 
Where a complainant has referred a dispute to the Ombudsman and her recommendations have been implemented, the complainant will normally be deemed to have elected to pursue an alternative public remedy to JR [46].

Tuesday, 21 August 2012

law report - transfer of principals, legitimate expectation

Ming & anor. v the Minister for Education and anor. [2012] SC (Bda) 39 Civ (1 August 2012)

The Applicants were seeking judicial review of the Minister's decision to transfer two school principals. Kawaley CJ found that the school PTAs had a legitimate expectation of being consulted prior to such a transfer [34]. The court exercised its discretion to quash the Minister's decision in order to give effect to this finding [44], putting the transfer plans on hold for another school year. Kawaley CJ said that it was only by granting the relief that the Minister would be stirred to honour its commitments to involve the PTAs as partners. He cited the fact that half of the island's parents have abandoned the public school system for consumer-friendly private schools which are more respectful of the aspirations and needs of citizens served by those schools.

The judgment is notable for Kawaley CJ's discussion of the principles of legitimate expectation and judicial review in the context of Bermuda [25]-[26]. He starts by drawing on the English principles, going back to Magna Carta. He says that Bermudian public law canot ignore Bermuda's own distinctive legal roots in the historical context of slavery, post-emancipation, oligarchical government and racial segregation, through to a parliamentary democracy with a written constitution.

This gives rise to tensions between democratic aspirations from civil society and Executive institutions not yet fully purged of more authoritarian notions of power.

He cites Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, who suggested an activist approach for judges in societies similar to Bermuda.

The Caribbean man and judge has an active role to play in re-interpreting the legal framework to build a more just society. The judge and legislator must perform the role of social engineer.

Kawaley CJ includes this quote to illustrate the role of the Court when interpreting legislation designed to promote social change.